Quote:Today’s Florida district court
ruling that the individual mandate is unconstitutional is by far the
best court opinion on this issue so far. Judge Roger Vinson provides a
thorough and impressive analysis of the federal government’s arguments
claiming that the mandate is authorized by the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause, and explains the flaws in each. He had already rejected the government’s claim that the mandate is constitutional because it is a tax in a previous ruling.
So far, all three federal courts that have considered the tax argument
have rejected it, instead ruling (in my view correctly) that the mandate
is a penalty.

Quote:This is perhaps the most important of all the anti-mandate lawsuits
because the plaintiffs include 26 state governments and the National
Federation of Independent Business.
One of the best parts of
today’s opinion is Judge Vinson’s critique of the federal government’s
argument that the mandate is constitutional under the Commerce Clause
because the Clause gives it the power to regulate “economic decisions”:

Quote:The
problem with this legal rationale, however, is it would essentially
have unlimited application. There is quite literally no decision that,
in the natural course of events, does not have an economic impact of
some sort. The decisions of whether and when (or not) to buy a house, a
car, a television, a dinner, or even a morning cup of coffee also have a
financial impact that — when aggregated with similar economic decisions
— affect the price of that particular product or service and have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. To be sure, it is not
difficult to identify an economic decision that has a cumulatively
substantial effect on interstate commerce; rather, the difficult task is
to find a decision that does not....
The important distinction is
that “economic decisions” are a much broader and far-reaching category
than are “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce”
[which Supreme Court precedent allows Congress to regulate]. While the
latter necessarily encompasses the first, the reverse is not true.
“Economic” cannot be equated to “commerce.” And “decisions” cannot be
equated to “activities.” Every person throughout the course of his or
her life makes hundreds or even thousands of life decisions that involve
the same general sort of thought process that the defendants maintain
is “economic activity.” There will be no stopping point if that should
be deemed the equivalent of activity for Commerce Clause purposes.

Quote:Judge Vinson has a similarly compelling answer to the government’s
claim that choosing not to purchase health insurance is an “economic
activity” because everyone participates in the health care market at
some point:

Quote:[T]here are lots of markets — especially
if defined broadly enough — that people cannot “opt out” of. For
example, everyone must participate in the food market. Instead of
attempting to control wheat supply by regulating the acreage and amount
of wheat a farmer could grow as in Wickard, under this logic, Congress
could more directly raise too low wheat prices merely by increasing
demand through mandating that every adult purchase and consume wheat
bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that because everyone must
participate in the market for food, non-consumers of wheat bread
adversely affect prices in the wheat market. Or, as was discussed during
oral argument, Congress could require that people buy and consume
broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required purchases
will positively impact interstate commerce, but also because people who
eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus more productive and put
less of a strain on the health care system. Similarly, because
virtually no one can be divorced from the transportation market,
Congress could require that everyone above a certain income threshold
buy a General Motors automobile — now partially government-owned —
because those who do not buy GM cars (or those who buy foreign cars) are
adversely impacting commerce and a taxpayer-subsidized business....

As
Vinson explains, both the “economic decisions” argument and the “health
care is special” argument ultimately amount to giving Congress the
power to mandate virtually anything, and therefore conflict with the
text of the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent.

Quote:Judge Vinson also notes that the scenarios he raises are not merely a “parade of horribles,” but have a realistic basis,

Quote:Turning to the Necessary and Proper Clause, Judge Vinson concedes that
the individual mandate is “necessary” under existing Supreme Court
precedent, but argues that it isn’t “proper” because the government’s
logic amounts to giving Congress virtually unlimited power.

Quote:Vinson also notes that the mandate probably runs afoul of the five part test recently outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Comstock, though he ultimately does not base his ruling on this point. ...  Overall, Judge Vinson’s analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause is a big improvement on Judge Henry Hudson’s performance in the recent Virginia ruling striking down the mandate.
Unlike Judge Henry Hudson in the Virginia case, Judge Vinson ruled
that the mandate is not “severable” from the rest of the health care
bill, and therefore invalidated it in its entirety. I think this may be
somewhat too sweeping. However, Vinson is on strong ground in ruling
that the mandate cannot be severed from the bill’s provisions forcing
insurance companies to cover people with preexisting conditions. As he
emphasizes, the federal government itself has repeatedly stressed this
point in the litigation.
Finally, Judge Vinson rejected the 26
states’ argument that the funding provisions of the bill are
unconstitutionally “coercive.”

Quote:Ultimately, the issue of the individual mandate will be resolved by the
courts of appeals and probably by the Supreme Court. Still, Judge
Vinson’s ruling is a victory for opponents of the mandate. It’s also
extremely well-written, and thereby provides a potential road map for
appellate judges who might be inclined to rule the same way.

Quote:'If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place
oblige it to control itself."


Federal Judge Roger Vinson opens his decision declaring ObamaCare
unconstitutional with that citation from Federalist No. 51, written by
James Madison in 1788. His exhaustive and erudite opinion is an
important moment for American liberty, and yesterday may well stand as
the moment the political branches were obliged to return to the
government of limited and enumerated powers that the framers envisioned.

Quote:I'd rather pay more in taxes, similar to what I understand is how the EU system works.

Sofaspud Wrote:The only difference is the time of payment, and I think you'll find that this is the precise thing that insurance companies make their money on -- they accept money from people in exchange for a promise to pay, immediately, the debt incurred as a result of whatever the policy covers, banking -- statistically -- on the fact that the majority of their clients don't actually make use of the insurance they purchase.  In addition, they manipulate the set, always looking to profit.  This is something else I find abhorrent, and is the main reason why I support higher taxes to pay for universal health care -- even though, both from a statistics standpoint and from a personal one, I won't see any direct benefit from it -- rather than mandatory payment to private insurers who are literally only there to make a buck.

Quote:Logan Darklighter wrote:
As Ezra Klein and several others
take pains to inform us, Vinson is a Republican-appointed judge.
Rhetorical question: do you think that when liberal rulings come down,
those same people are equally eager to lead with the fact that the
judges in question are Democrat-appointed?

Quote:In his ruling, Vinson repeated what he has said
previously — that “the citizens of this country have an interest in
having this case resolved as soon as practically possible.”

“That was nearly eleven months ago,” he wrote. “In the time since,
the battle lines have been drawn, the relevant case law marshaled, and
the legal arguments refined. Almost everyone agrees that the
constitutionality of the Act is an issue that will ultimately have to be
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is very important
to everyone in this country that this case move forward.”

Quote:After careful consideration of the factors noted above,
and all the arguments set forth in the defendants’ motion to clarify, I
find that the motion, construed as a motion for stay, should be GRANTED.
However, the stay will be conditioned upon the defendants filing their
anticipated appeal within seven (7) calendar days of this order and
seeking an expedited appellate review, either in the Court of Appeals or
with the Supreme Court under Rule 11 of that Court.

Quote:So to “clarify” my order and judgment: The individual
mandate was declared unconstitutional. Because that “essential”
provision was unseverable from the rest of the Act, the entire
legislation was void. This declaratory judgment was expected to be
treated as the “practical” and “functional equivalent of an injunction”
with respect to the parties to the litigation. This expectation was
based on the “longstanding presumption” that the defendants themselves
identified and agreed to be bound by, which provides that a declaratory
judgment against federal officials is a de facto injunction. To the
extent that the defendants were unable (or believed that they were
unable) to comply, it was expected that they would immediately seek a
stay of the ruling, and at that point in time present their arguments
for why such a stay is necessary, which is the usual and standard
procedure. It was not expected that they would effectively ignore the
order and declaratory judgment for two and one-half weeks, continue to
implement the Act, and only then file a belated motion to “clarify.”6

Quote:The defendants have suggested, for example, that my order
and judgment could not have been intended to have the full force of an
injunction because, if I had so intended, I would have been “required to
apply the familiar four-factor test” to determine if injunctive relief
was appropriate. …

I did not undertake this four-factor analysis for a simple reason: it
was not necessary. Even though the defendants had technically disputed
that the plaintiffs could satisfy those four factors, the defendants had
acknowledged in their summary judgment opposition brief that, if I were
to find for the plaintiffs, separate injunctive relief would be
superfluous and unnecessary. The defendants expressly assured the court
that, in light of the “long-standing presumption that a declaratory
judgment provides adequate relief as against an executive officer, as it
will not be presumed that that officer will ignore the judgment of the
Court,” any declaratory judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor “would [ ] be
adequate to vindicate [the plaintiffs’] claims.” Defendants’ Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for  summary Judgment (doc. 137), at
43. Consequently, there was no need to discuss and apply the
four-factor test to determine if injunctive relief was appropriate
because the defendants had confirmed that they would “not . . . ignore
the judgment of the Court” and that my “declaratory judgment would [ ]
be adequate.” In other words, the defendants are now claiming that it is
somehow confusing that I bypassed the four-factor test and applied the
“long-standing presumption” that they themselves had identified and
specifically insisted that they would honor.